The Implications of Science-Technology for the Legal Process by Yegge, Robert B.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 47 Issue 4 Article 38 
April 2021 
The Implications of Science-Technology for the Legal Process 
Robert B. Yegge 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Robert B. Yegge, The Implications of Science-Technology for the Legal Process, 47 Denv. L.J. 549 (1970). 
This Front Matter is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For 
more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 47 1970 NUMBER 4
THE IMPLICATIONS OF SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY
FOR THE LEGAL PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
N 1963 the University of Denver College of Law faced what was then
a novel question: "What is the relationship between law and the
behavioral sciences ?" As a first step toward finding the answer, we
called together a group of scholars and practitioners from the bench,
the bar, and the behavioral sciences to explore the question and to give
us some advice on what our institution could do to utilize the social
sciences in broadening legal education.
Our advisors told us that justice was really our topic and that
the subject dealt with the "[d3etermination of the controversies that
arise in society between man and man or between the individual and
the state in a way that takes due and proper account both of demands
of general legal principles and of the merits of particular concrete
cases."' We were told, of course, that
there is more to justice than this. Law is not a closed system; it lives
and progresses and gains its great momentum only when the passion
for justice is shared by all members of the society .... [I]t is not
enough that justice be done. It must also be seen to be done. Persons
who come into touch with the functioning of legal institutions, [sic]
as jurymen, witnesses or parties, [sic] must be persuaded of law's right-
ness, must be brought to say: "Yes, that was right; that was fair."
2
Further, the College of Law was reminded of the
law explosion, the proliferation of controversies and legal problems of
range and number quite beyond anything with which an earlier legal
order has ever had to deal. To a limited extent, this law explosion is
a function of the population explosion: twice as many people, there-
fore twice as many law suits, twice as many offenses, twice as many
delinquencies.
• . . Contributing to the law explosion are the tasks created for
law administration by the vast and almost incomprehensible techno-
logical developments of this century.
1 Jones, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: The Case for Partnership, 47 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y
109 (1963).
2 1d. at 109, 110.
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* * * Whether we like it or not ... the administration of justice is
no longer a handcraft like custom tailoring or cabinet making.3
We were also told that "this is a time of vast social change, a time
in which we encounter not only massive increases in population but
also new social conditions, new ideas of social justice, new and unset-
tling demands for equal opportunity and status."'4 Indeed, "law must
be stable, and yet it cannot stand still. If law stands still, it loses its
powers as a force for social stability.'' 5
Lastly, we were told that law must be responsive to social change.
Law, in a sense, has been a technology in search of a "pure science"
partner .... Social science insights and methods are there to be drawn
on for the improvement of legal institutions ... men of law must ask
the behavioral scientists to come over into Macedonia and help us.
Perhaps the greatest task the legal scholars, judges, and practicing
lawyers have in the years ahead is to devise patterns of colleagueship
... within which the subtle and disciplined knowledge and techniques
of the social sciences can be drawn on for the advancement of legal
understanding and the improvement of legal institutions. 6
The Chairman of the Committee of Advisors back in 1963 was
Dr. Donald R. Young -our Chairman for this conference. Under his
watchful and thoughtful eyes, some significant new directions were
given to legal education at the University of Denver College of Law.
Initially, the Administration of Justice Program, funded by the Russell
Sage Foundation, provided a base for curricular and research activities;
and very soon the idea of developing a partnership between law and
the behavioral sciences was accepted and began to spread through the
curriculum so that today social science concepts and materials are found
in most of our law school courses. An important medium for this grass-
roots development has been the appointment of social scientists, who
are not lawyers, to the full-time faculty as full colleagues of the legally
trained faculty. Presently there are four sociologists, an economist, a
social psychologist, a political scientist, and a theologian serving on
the law faculty along with their colleagues who hold law degrees.
The rationale for the conference of advisors in 1963 is recalled
today. As we pursue our tenacious commitment to the implementation
of a partnership between law and the behavioral sciences, we are
continually reminded of the equal importance of a pure science partner-
ship - a slightly different twist on the 1963 summary observations
just described. Indeed, we find that the "law explosion" has a dimension
not specifically observed in 1963 - an explosion triggered by a science-
technology fuse; because for the legal system (which has repeatedly
been shown not to be a closed system) to be just, there must be due
3 Id. at 110.
4 1d. at 111.




and careful account taken of the assessment of technology which science
has wrought. And technology has shown us certain ways for the older
legal system to convert technological handicrafts into that system.
Clearly, the effects of technological developments have underscored
the need for the law to be responsive to social change.
Now, 7 years after our initial explorations and subsequent deep
involvements with the partnership between law and behavioral sciences,
we, the College of Law faculty, feel compelled to explore carefully
and systematically the case for a partnership between law and pure
science, including its technological implications. Under the expert guid-
ance of the same distinguished Chairman, Donald R. Young, and with
the able planning assistance of Professors John H. Reese, of our own
College of Law, and Ernest M. Jones of the University of Florida Law
School, we have gathered experts in science, technology, and the law
together to give us the benefit of their good advice. We need directions
for seeking another partner. While we think that our model for estab-
lishing a partnership with behavioral scientists has been a viable one, we
cannot be assured that the same paradigm is operative for incorporating
the knowledge of science and learning to assess its technology.
Our primary aim is to look at the directions which legal education
might take in view of the impact of science-technology and the need
for assessment. Hopefully, what legal education does, the law will do
also. Right or wrong, we feel that as an institution committed to
training future generations of law men (who will make, interpret, and
reform laws), we should be engaged critically and constructively in the
business of considering the implications of science-technology on legal
process.
It might be fallacious for us to draw on the experiences we have
had with the behavioral sciences. Yet, let me offer a few observations
about that program, all of which we may wish to challenge when we
think about interdisciplinary efforts which combine law, science, and
technology.
First, we have found the strategy of full and equal colleagueship
of non-lawyer behavioral scientists and legal scholars to be a most
desirable initial structure.
Second, we have found that introduction of experimental and
untested courses into the curricular offerings has been frustrating but,
over the long haul, productive. At least, students taking the experi-
mental courses have begun to think in interdisciplinary terms and, more
importantly, to research and write in those new terms with the guidance
of social science teachers, both to the advancement of the partnership
and, we believe, to the advancement of knowledge.
Third, after several years of groping, we have learned that clinical
legal education plays an important part in the ultimate success of the
1970
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partnership between law and the social sciences. While it was somewhat
unexpected, we have found that the real and lasting merger of interests
between law men and social scientists comes when real life legal prob-
lems are actually confronted, particularly in the area of the public
interest law suit.
Fourth, our students have observed - and we think it is partially
due to our systematic fusion of social science methods and knowledge
into the legal curriculum - that law is inadequate to handle all social
problems. In working with students from other disciplines, law students
have come to this realization. There is a great irony in this recognition
by law students that their intellectual horizons are broadened by work-
ing with students in other disciplines, an effect which might be described
as the "humanizing" influence of scientific inquiry on law and as the
study of the real world rather than merely the individualized case.
Science and its technology offers, we believe, great challenges to
law and therefore to the education of those who make, interpret, and
administer law. We called this conference to help us begin to chart a
course for a partnership between law, science, and technology at the
law school level, with the sincere and optimistic hope that we may build
another successful program to the end that justice shall be re-explored
and, through that re-exploration, improved.
Robert B. Yegge
Dean
University of Denver
College of Law
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